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The first part of this survey article offered a cartography of some of
the more extensively studied forms of multisensory processing. In
this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible
ways in which the structure of conscious perceptual experience
might also be characterized as multisensory. In addition, I discuss
the significance of research on multisensory processing and multi-
sensory consciousness for philosophical debates concerning the
modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individua-
tion of the senses.1 | INTRODUCTION
Philosophical and psychological research on perception has historically tended to proceed on a sense‐by‐sense basis,
treating the perceptual modalities as functionally and anatomically independent channels of information about the
world (but for an early exception, see Stratton, 1897, 1899). This picture of perception now looks to be substantially
incorrect. Numerous experimental studies as well as recently influential causal inference models of perception provide
reason to think that multisensory processing in the brain is the norm rather than the exception (Ernst, 2012; Kayser &
Shams, 2015; Körding et al., 2007; Rohde, van Dam, & Ernst, 2016; Shams, 2012); that the senses adaptively interact
with one another at both early and late stages of perceptual processing (Ghazanfar & Schroeder, 2006; Kupers,
Pietrini, Ricciardi, & Ptito, 2011; Shams & Kim, 2010); and that integrating, comparing, or otherwise combining sources
of information from different modalities serves both to optimize the estimation of environmental attributes as well as
the control of bodily actions (for reviews, see Stein & Meredith, 1993; Calvert, Spence, & Stein, 2004; Spence &
Driver, 2004; Trommershäuser, Kording, & Landy, 2011; and Stein, 2012).
It is important, however, to distinguish between multisensory processing and its possible effects on perceptual
consciousness (Deroy, Chen, & Spence, 2014; Macpherson, 2011c; Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch, 2014; O'Callaghan
2008, 2012, forthcoming). That the senses pervasively interact with one another at the subpersonal, information‐
processing level does not by itself entails that experiences produced by such interaction are multisensory in theoretically
interesting ways. Interactions between the senses might always result in perceptual experiences that are unimodal both
in respect of their phenomenal character and representational content.
The first part of this survey article presented a cartography of some of the more extensively studied forms of mul-
tisensory processing. In this second part, I turn to examining some of the different possible ways in which the- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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nificance of research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness for philosophical debates
concerning the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individuation of the senses.2 | IS ALL PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE MODALITY SPECIFIC?
Casey O'Callaghan refers to the following traditional view in the philosophy of perception as the “composite snapshot
conception”:...one's total perceptual experience at a time is an assemblage or composite of modality‐specific
experiences. Perceptual experience comprises discrete, modality‐specific components or ‘snapshots’. Each
such modality‐specific experience has its own recognizable and distinctive character (O'Callaghan, 2008:
321).For present purposes, I shall interpret the composite snapshot conception as comprising two main claims. First,
the phenomenal character of a subject's overall perceptual experience at a time is always “exhausted by that which
could be instantiated by a corresponding merely visual, merely auditory, merely tactual, merely gustatory, or merely
olfactory experience, plus whatever accrues thanks to simple co‐consciousness” (O'Callaghan, 2015: 562).1 Call this
claim the “composition thesis.” Second, all perceptual phenomenal character is modality specific. Call this claim the
“distinctiveness thesis.” The distinctiveness thesis can be formulated in stronger and weaker terms. According to what
O'Callaghan, 2015 refers to as “local” distinctiveness, every phenomenal feature is instantiated by perceptual experi-
ences of just one modality. No aspect of visual phenomenal character, for example, could be instantiated by an expe-
rience of touch or audition. A proponent of what O'Callaghan calls “regional” distinctiveness, in contrast, is committed
to the weaker claim that within each modality, there are certain phenomenal features that are distinctive to that
modality. On this view, it is only the overall phenomenal character of a perceptual experience of a given modality that
is distinctive to that modality (O'Callaghan, 2015: 558).
The composite snapshot conception of perceptual consciousness has been challenged with a wide range of
empirically and phenomenologically motivated objections. In the remainder of this section, I critically examine these
objections in turn, beginning with the argument from common sensibles.2.1 | The argument from common sensibles
Common sensibles are properties and relations that can be perceived through more than one modality. 3‐D shape, for
example, is a common sensible. So is the time at which an event occurs: it is possible to see, feel, and hear the moment
at which a door knocker strikes the metal plate on a door. The existence of common sensibles, so understood, poses a
prima facie challenge to the local distinctiveness thesis.
O'Callaghan (2014b, 2015) outlines a number of possible responses to the argument from common sensibles. One
straightforward move is to drop to local distinctiveness for regional distinctiveness. Another way of responding
appeals to modality‐specific modes of presentation (Lopes 2000, Hopkins 2005, and Kulvicki 2007; for a skeptical
assessment, see Bayne, 2014). Yet a third possible response appeals to modality‐inflected phenomenal character, that
is, phenomenal character that is partly determined by a “way” or “manner” of representation attaching to the modality
itself (Chalmers, 2004). On this approach, perceptual modalities are introspectively different manners of relating to
contents, and this is reflected in our experience of common sensibles across different modalities.2.2 | The argument from optimizing multisensory integration
A distinct type of argument against the composite snapshot view targets the decomposition thesis. Optimizing mul-
tisensory integration (or O‐integration for short) occurs when the initial estimates of a property provided by different
BRISCOE 3 of 13modalities are weighted by their relative reliability and combined in a way that optimizes, that is, reduces the variance
in, the final perceptual estimate of that property (Ernst, 2012 provides a helpful overview). Examples of O‐integration
include the ventriloquism effect (Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004) and the sound‐induced flash illusion (Shams, Kamitani,
& Shimojo, 2002). For discussion, see Section 2.2 of the first part of this entry.
Spence and Bayne, 2014 distinguish between causal and constitutive conceptions of O‐integration (see also Mac-
pherson 2011: 446–449). According to the (purely) causal conception, the conscious end products of O‐integration
are wholly unisensory. According to the constitutive conception, by contrast, O‐integration is reflected in conscious
perceptual content that cannot be decomposed into distinct, unisensory layers. For example, the result of O‐integra-
tion in the ventriloquism effect cannot always be decomposed into a merely visual plus a merely auditory experience
of an event's location. Instead, O‐integration may result in an inherently audio–visual representation of the event.
A circumspect assessment of relevant phenomenological and experimental evidence, a number of theorists have
argued, is consistent with the purely causal view of O‐integration (Deroy et al., 2014; Nudds, 2014; O'Callaghan,
forthcoming; Spence & Bayne, 2014). Nudds, 2014, for example, writes: “this kind of integration does not undermine
the idea that perceptual states are modality specific: that although the representational contents of the perceptual
states of one modality are influenced by the contents of the perceptual states of another modality, our perceptual
awareness of distal objects is explained in terms ofmodality‐specific object representations” (183). And here is O'Cal-
laghan, forthcoming: “coordinated perceptual awareness across the senses... is compatible withmultisensory percep-
tual awareness being exhausted by that which is associated with each of the respective modalities along with
whatever accrues thanks to mere co‐consciousness” (manuscript draft: 8–9). If this is right, then the ventriloquism
effect and other cases of O‐integration do not equip us with compelling evidence against the decomposition thesis.2.3 | The argument from intermodal feature binding
An alternative argument against the composite snapshot view is based on the possibility of intermodal binding aware-
ness. There has been a large amount of research on intramodal feature binding, for example, on the attribution of
shapes, colors, sizes, textures, and other features to objects by the visual system (Robertson, 2003; Treisman,
1999, 2003). That perceptual experiences within each of the modalities exhibit feature binding is relatively uncontro-
versial. There is substantial debate, however, about whether features experienced through different modalities can
perceptually appear to be bound to the same object. If such intermodal binding awareness occurs, then “it is possible
multimodally to perceptually experience the apparent co‐instantiation of attributes perceived through different
senses” (O'Callaghan, 2015: 557, emphasis added). Skeptics about intermodal binding awareness include Fulkerson,
2013, Connolly, 2014, Deroy et al., 2014, Spence & Bayne, 2014, and Nudds, 2016.
A first, empirically motivated argument for intermodal binding awareness appeals to research on multisensory
“object files.” An object file is a short‐lived, perceptual representation that functions to keep track of an object across
time and space and to store information about its potentially changing properties (Kahneman & Treisman, 1984;
Kahneman, Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992, Noles, Scholl, & Mitroff, 2005). One source of evidence for the existence of such
representations comes from studies of object‐specific preview effects:In a typical object reviewing display, a small number of objects (small outlined boxes) are initially presented,
and letters are then displayed within them. The letters then disappear and the objects briefly move about
the screen. When they halt, a final letter is displayed within one of the objects, and the observer's task is
simply to name that letter as quickly as possible. This response is typically slightly faster when the letter
matches one of the initially presented letters.... However, observers are faster still to name the final letter
when it is the same letter that initially appeared on that object, as compared with when the final letter
initially appeared on a different object—an object‐specific preview benefit (Noles et al., 2005: 325).There is evidence that object‐specific preview benefits can occur intermodally (Jordan, Clark, & Mitroff, 2010;
Zmigrod & Hommel, 2011; Zmigrod, Spapé, Hommel, & B., 2009). As Bayne, 2014, O'Callaghan, 2015, and Spence
4 of 13 BRISCOE& Bayne, 2014 point out, however, the empirical evidence for the existence of multisensory object files is inconclusive
with respect to the existence of non‐modality‐specific object representations in conscious experience. In an experi-
ment by Mitroff, Scholl, and Wynn (2005), for example, subjects were shown an ambiguous bouncing/streaming dis-
play in which two moving objects could either be perceived to bounce off or stream through each other when their
paths crossed. Mitroff and colleagues found that when the displays were designed so as to yield a strong bias toward
the streaming interpretation, “there was nevertheless a strong OSPB in the opposite direction—such that the object
files appeared to have ‘bounced’ even though the percept ‘streamed’” (67). They interpreted this result as showing
that the contents of conscious visual experience need not directly correspond to the information stored in visual
object files. More relevantly, Zmigrod and Hommel (2011) investigated the relationship between audio–visual feature
binding and conscious perception of audible and visual features as belonging to the same event. They conclude that
“binding effects were entirely unrelated to conscious perception and did not even decrease in size when the bound
features were perceived as separate events” (592).
Current experimental work on intermodal feature binding, then, does not provide uncontroversial support for
intermodal binding awareness. For this reason, Bayne (2014) proposes to focus instead on what he takes to be one
of the phenomenologically salient effects of optimizing multisensory integration. His example involves the sound‐
induced flash illusion:…it seems to me that the perceptual experience that one has in the context of the sound‐induced flash
illusion does not leave it as an open question whether the flash and the beep are manifestations of a
single event, but instead imposes this requirement on one's environment........ claims about the numerical
identity of perceptual objects are built into the content of one's perceptual experience in the sound‐
induced flash illusion and many other examples of [multisensory integration] (Bayne, 2014: 26–27).Kubovy and Schutz (2010) offer a similar assessment:To use phenomenological evidence [for audio‐visual binding awareness] we would need a clear criterion for
saying when an acoustic event and a visual event were bound to form a single audio‐visual object. Some
cases are clear. The sound and sight of a glass shattering leave no doubt in our minds that what we
heard and saw was caused by the same physical event (54).The problem, as often is the case in phenomenological disputes, is that other theorists simply deny the existence
of any such clear, introspective evidence. Spence and Bayne (2014), for example, write:we think it is debatable whether the ‘unity of the event’ really is internal to one's experience in these cases,
or whether it involves a certain amount of post‐perceptual processing (or inference). In other words, it
seems to us to be an open question whether, in these situations, one's experience is of a MPO
[multisensory perceptual object] or whether it is instead structured in terms of multiple instances of
unimodal perceptual objects (119).One phenomenologically‐motivated way of attempting to move forward here, developed by O'Callaghan, utilizes
the method of phenomenal contrast: “Take a pair of cases that controls for [experienced] spatio‐temporal features and
for other aspects of perceptual phenomenology. A case in which you ‘get’ the perceptual effect of intermodal binding
awareness may contrast in character with an otherwise similar one in which you do not” (O'Callaghan, 2014a: 86). One
example, he suggests, is the experience of ventriloquism:You may seem to hear the visible puppet speaking, even if you are not taken in. Contrast this with a poor
attempt at ventriloquism, in which it is perceptually evident that the visible puppet is not what you hear
(O'Callaghan, 2014a: 83).Another example involves the experience of a watching a movie when the timing of the soundtrack is off:
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very poorly aligned soundtrack stems in part from perceiving audible and visible features as belonging to
something common in the coincident case but not in the misaligned case (O'Callaghan, 2014a: 85).The skeptic about intermodal binding awareness, however, will regard O'Callaghan's interpretation of these cases
as question begging. It is equally plausible, she will insist, that the experience of successful ventriloquism can be
decomposed into visual and auditory experiences that are spatially and/or temporally coordinated with one another.
In other words, what is absent when ventriloquism is unsuccessful is not intermodal binding awareness, but rather a
sufficient degree of correspondence between visually and auditorily experienced (i.e., perceptually apparent), spatio-
temporal features. Controlling for differences in such features should eliminate any phenomenal contrast between
cases of successful and unsuccessful ventriloquism.
O'Callaghan is prepared for this skeptical response. “Intermodal binding awareness,” he writes, “may depend not
just on spatio‐temporal cues, but also on factors such as whether and how the subject is attending, the plausibility of
the combination or the compellingness of the match, and whether the subject expects one event or multiple events to
occur.... fixing spatio‐temporal features does not by itself suffice in context to fix whether intermodal binding occurs”
(2014a: 85, emphasis added). In support of this conclusion, he points to an influential study of temporal ventriloquism
by Vatakis and Spence, 2007. In temporal ventriloquism, “visual stimuli are ‘pulled’ into approximate temporal align-
ment with the corresponding auditory stimuli” (Vatakis & Spence, 2007: 744). What Vatakis and Spence found is that
subjects found it easier to make temporal order judgments (TOJs) when auditory and visual speech stimuli were gen-
der‐mismatched, for example, a female face presented with a male voice, than when they were gender‐matched, for
example, a male face presented with a male voice. They interpreted this result in terms of a high‐level “unity effect”
(Welch & Warren, 1980; Warren 1999) on audio–visual multisensory integration: because male faces and male voices
are categorized as belonging together, subjects' visual experience of the time at which the face's lips begin to move is
pulled into alignment with their auditory experience of the time at which the voice is heard.
Contrary to O'Callaghan, however, Vatakis and Spence's study does not motivate the view that intermodal bind-
ing awareness can vary across cases in which experienced, spatiotemporal features are held constant. Although it is
correct that differences in subjects' TOJs across conditions were not determined by differences in spatiotemporal
cues (Vatakis and Spence “attempted to minimize any such bottom‐up differences in the integration of the auditory
and visual speech stimuli in the present study by carefully matching the [objective] timing of the visual and auditory
events used to make the matched and mismatched videos” (2007: 753)), the gender‐related unity effects discovered in
the experiment were clearly on subjects' awareness of intermodal temporal relations.
In support of intermodal binding awareness, O'Callaghan (2014a, forthcoming) also points to studies that suggest
that different types of O‐integration can be selectively disrupted. First, subjects with autism spectrum disorder (ASD)
do not use visual information to disambiguate audible speech in a neurotypical way. Among other things, children with
ASD exhibit a much weaker McGurk effect than children without ASD (Mongillo et al., 2008). One explanation of def-
icits in audiovisual speech processing in ASD, however, is that subjects with ASD are significantly impaired in estimat-
ing the relative timing of auditory and visual speech signals (Brock et al., 2002; Stevenson et al., 2014). The same point
can be made in connection with another example involving a patient, AWF, who cannot integrate auditory and visual
speech information, described by Hamilton et al., 2006. The problem with this example is that AWF's linguistic deficit
is explicitly characterized as a “perceived temporal asynchrony between vision and audition” (Hamilton et al., 2006:
71). If this is correct, then the relevant studies do not present persuasive empirical evidence for the absence of inter-
modal binding awareness in the presence of perceived, intermodal, spatiotemporal congruence.22.4 | The argument from novel feature instances
Some features may have instances that can be perceived only by means of one sense. Color, for example, may be per-
ceptible only by means of vision. If so, then color is a proper sensible. Other features may have instances that can be
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Shape, for this reason, is traditionally classified as a common sensible. Yet other features may have instances that can
only be perceived using multiple senses in concert, instances that are “accessible only multisensorily” (O'Callaghan,
forthcoming: 18). If so, then the composition thesis is false.
Spatial relations between objects experienced using different modalities are sometimes cited as an example. Tim
Bayne (2014) writes: “one can be aware of the sound of a siren as being to the left of a visually presented dog. What...
is the phenomenal character of one's awareness of this spatial relation? Clearly it could be neither purely visual nor
purely auditory” (2014: 20). As O'Callaghan 2014 points out, however, this sort of case may just involve experiencing
spatial locations or directions in different modalities co‐consciously, rather than experiencing genuinely novel inter-
modal spatial relations.
A more compelling case involves evidence for intermodal meter perception. A recent study by Huang et al. (2012)
found that auditory and tactile sequences were coherently grouped by musically trained subjects performing a meter
recognition task. Importantly, neither channel by itself produced a coherent meter percept: in other words, the meter
percept generated by audio‐tactile grouping was novel relative to the intramodal sequences considered in isolation.
Such intermodal meter perception, Charles Spence writes, “constitutes one of the first genuinely intersensory
Gestalten to have been documented to date” (Spence, 2015: 647).3 O'Callaghan, 2015 makes a convincing case that
other types of features may have instances that are accessible only multisensorily. The examples that he discusses
include intermodal causal relations and intermodal apparent motion.2.5 | The argument from novel feature types
As O'Callaghan points out, the argument against the composite snapshot conception from novel feature instances is
limited in the following way:You can perceive spatial, temporal, and causal relations through vision, touch, or hearing alone. Since these
feature types are familiar from unisensory contexts, perceptual awareness of their intermodal instances
need not be multisensory in a deeper respect....
...The arguments above demonstrate that... not every multisensory episode is just the co‐conscious sum of
its modality‐specific parts. However, they do not show that it is not possible to account for multisensory
perceptual awareness, even of novel feature instances, just in terms of (unimodal or amodal) features
that unimodal perceptual experiences could have. And so, we might still say that the qualitative
components of phenomenological character are not in this respect deeply multisensory (O'Callaghan,
forthcoming: 30).A much stronger argument would undertake to show that there are types of features that can only be perceived
multisensorily. Flavor properties, on one account (Smith, 2015; O'Callaghan 2014, 2015), answer to this description.
According to the account, a substance's flavor is not represented by any single modality functioning in isolation.
Instead, it depends on the combination of inputs from taste and retronasal olfaction; thermal and somatosensory cues;
as well as information concerning chemical irritation and nociception supplied by the trigeminal system (Auvray &
Spence, 2008).4
To use terminology introduced in the first part of this survey article, flavor perception may be an example of non‐
optimizing, “generative” multisensory integration (or G‐integration for short). In G‐integration, combining sources of
environmental or bodily information from different modalities gives rise to the representation of a genuinely novel
and “deeply multisensory” type of feature–one that could not be represented by any of the contributing modalities
functioning in isolation.
Another possible example of G‐integration, I suggested, is the experience of location (egocentric distance and
direction) in external space. When G‐integrated with sources of proprioceptive information, visual, auditory, and
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relative spatial reference frames (Briscoe, 2008, 2009; Briscoe & Schwenkler, 2015; Clark, 2011; Matthen, 2014,
2017). This is important not only because it supports our experience of a stable spatially structured world accessible
through different senses, but also because it enables the crossmodal cuing of selective spatial attention (Spence,
2010; Spence & Ho, 2015) and the registration of crossmodal spatial congruence necessary for certain cases of
O‐integration (for further discussion, see the first part of this entry).3 | OTHER PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES
The last section of this review critically examined a number of arguments against the composite snapshot conception
of perceptual experience. This section focuses on the relevance of research on multisensory processing for debates
about the modularity of perception, cognitive penetration, and the individuation of the senses.
3.1 | Multisensory processing and modularity
Jerry Fodor (1983, 2001) influentially argued that perceptual “input analyzers” are modular, informationally encapsu-
lated cognitive mechanisms. Vision, for example, functions to form representations of distal layout solely on the basis
of sources of information in its proprietary database (think here of the different types of learned or innate “prior
knowledge” to which Bayesian vision scientists make appeal) combined with afferent outputs from retinal transducers
as well as efferent outputs from the oculomotor system.
At first blush, the different types of multisensory processing surveyed in the first part of this review challenge the
Fodorian thesis that the senses are modular. The challenge, however, may be more apparent than real. Arguably, the
key distinction for Fodor is between systems that, in principle, have unlimited access to stored, conceptual and non-
conceptual information and systems that, by contrast, operate on a restricted class of inputs: “the claim that input sys-
tems are informationally encapsulated is equivalent to the claim that the data that can bear on the confirmation of
perceptual hypotheses includes, in the general case, considerably less than the organism may know.... [Input systems
do] not have access to all of the information that the organism internally represents” (Fodor, 1983: 69, emphasis
added; see Burnston & Cohen, 2015 for an insightful discussion). Unlike systems supporting, for example, personal‐
level practical reasoning, input‐analyzing systems typically do not have computational access to the contents of the
subject's beliefs, intentions, and desires. They are cognitively impenetrable in the sense of Pylyshyn, 1999. So, even
if there are “horizontal” information‐sharing links between the senses at multiple computational levels (Shams &
Kim, 2010), perceptual processing may be largely insensitive to much of the conceptually structured information avail-
able to central systems involved in high‐level, theoretical inference and practical decision making (Deroy, 2015).
3.2 | The unity assumption and cognitive penetration
Evidence of certain high‐level “unity effects” on optimizing multisensory integration (O‐integration) complicate this
picture, however. Some relevant experimental findings include the following:
A. A subject's belief that an auditory and visual stimulus “belong together,” it has been suggested, can enhance
audio–visual O‐integration (for reviews, seeWelch &Warren, 1980; Bertelson, 1999; and Bertelson & de Gelder,
2004). Visual biasing of auditory localization (ventriloquism), as evidenced by a pointing task, for example, has
been reported to be greater when a kettle visibly emitting steam is paired with a whistling sound than when lights
and meaningless tones are paired (Jackson, 1953).
B. O‐integration of visual and haptic shape estimates can occur when subjects indirectly see their hand touching an
object in a mirror. In the relevant experimental condition, a mirror was used to introduce an apparent separation
of about 16 cm between the felt and the visible location of the object (Helbig & Ernst, 2007). The experimenters
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occur, even in the case of spatial discrepancy” (1524).
C. Temporal ventriloquism occurs when auditory and visual speech stimuli are gender‐matched, for example, a male
face presented with a male voice, but not when they are gender‐mismatched, for example, a female face pre-
sented with a male voice (Vatakis & Spence, 2007). Because male faces and male voices are categorized as
“belonging together,” subjects' visual experience of the time at which the face's lips begin to move is seemingly
pulled into alignment with their auditory experience of the time at which the voice is heard (see Section 2.3
above).
Collectively, these results have been taken as evidence that cognitive states like beliefs can “penetrate” percep-
tual experience by influencing the O‐integration process. There is room for skepticism, however. With regard to A, a
number of studies have failed to find that familiarity or other cognitive factors influence the magnitude of the ventril-
oquism effect (for reviews, see Bertelson, 1999 and Bertelson & de Gelder, 2004). Contradictory findings may be
explained, in part, by the fact that realistic pairings (e.g., kettles and whistles) are informationally rich in comparison
with artificial pairings (e.g., briefly flashed lights and tones). In particular, they “have a greater internal temporal coher-
ence and temporally varying structure” (Vatakis & Spence, 2007: 745; see also Deroy, 2014, 2015). It is also possible
that findings suggestive of cognitive penetration actually reflect effects of background knowledge or experimental
demands on post‐perceptual judgments or motor responses (Bertelson 1994, 1999; Welch, 1999; Vatakis & Spence,
2007; Firestone & Scholl, 2015).
Turning to B, Helbig and Ernst suggest that “because participants were familiar with mirrors and because they saw
their fingers exploring the object in the mirror, they had good reason to believe that both sensory inputs originated
from the same physical object (2007: 1526, emphasis added). This may be so, but lower‐level, perceptual factors
may have been more directly responsible for the O‐integration of visual and haptic size estimates in their experiment.
In particular, even if visual and haptic signals were spatially discrepant, they exhibited a high degree of temporally
coordinated structure. Further, it is not obvious that in order to solve the multisensory causal inference problem here
(“Is the object visible in the mirror identical to the object being touched?”), the perceptual system must rely on sub-
jects' beliefs about the etiology of mirror images. “What is required in using a mirror,” Ruth Millikan suggests, “is only
that one accommodate governance of one's perceptions and guided motions to a new semantic mapping function in
taking account of the relation of seen objects to oneself. In the rearview mirror, I directly see that there is a car behind
me. The car behind guides my motion in relation to it appropriately and directly” (Millikan, 2004: 122–123; see
Schwitzgebel, 2014 for a similar assessment).
Two points are important. First, sophisticated conceptual representations such as beliefs, on this account, are not
required for successful mirror use. Consistent with this conclusion, there is evidence that a number of nonhuman ani-
mals, including chimpanzees, marmosets, elephants, and magpies, are capable of using mirrors instrumentally to solve
certain problems (for a review, see Gieling et al. 2014). Second, for subjects familiar with mirrors, objects seen in a
mirror may look to be located where they really are. When a subject sees a car in her rearview mirror, it visually
appears behind her, not in front of her. Similarly, when a subject sees her hand in a mirror, it may visually appear to
be located where she proprioceptively represents it as being located. But, if this right, then it would be incorrect to
interpret Helbig and Ernst's experimental findings as evidence that “knowledge that what we see is what we feel is
sufficient for integration to occur, even in the case of spatial discrepancy.”5
C, in my view, provides the most compelling evidence that O‐integration can be influenced by high‐level, cogni-
tive or “non‐structural” factors. Subsequent studies by Vatakis and colleagues strongly suggest, however, that audio–
visual speech processing may be special. Vatakis and Spence (2008) found no unity effect onTOJs for pairs of auditory
and visual nonspeech stimuli that either matched (e.g., the sight of a key being struck on a piano heard with the appro-
priate sound) or mismatched (e.g., the sight of a hammer smashing a block of ice dubbed with the sound of a bouncing
ball). The unity assumption, they write “does not seem to influence people's temporal perception of realistic, multisen-
sory, non‐speech stimuli” (19). Relatedly, Vatakis et al. 2008 report that the unity effect does not influence audio‐
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present purposes, the main point is that the role apparently played by cognitive factors in audio‐visual speech pro-
cessing does not necessarily generalize to other cases of O‐integration.3.3 | Individuating the senses
Research on multisensory processing and multisensory consciousness complicates philosophical attempts to individ-
uate the senses, that is, to explain what distinguishes one sense from another (for helpful overviews, see the essays
collected in Macpherson, 2011b, Fulkerson, 2014, Stokes, Matthen, & Biggs, 2014, and Matthen, 2015). Grice,
1962 suggested four, nonmutually exclusive ways of approaching this problem:
1. The Represented Properties Criterion: each sense is individuated by the objects and/or the range of features (prop-
erties and relations) that it represents.
2. The Phenomenal Character Criterion: each sense is individuated by the phenomenal character of the experiences
to which it gives rise.
3. The Proximal Stimulus Criterion: each sense is individuated by the range of proximal stimuli to which its transducer
systems evolved or have learned to respond.
4. The Sense Organ Criterion: each sense is individuated by a distinct set of transducer systems and perceptual infor-
mation‐processing mechanisms.
According to a maximally skeptical view, pervasive interaction and information‐sharing between brain regions
involved in processing outputs from retinal ganglion cells, cutaneous mechanoreceptors, and other peripheral
transducers renders the very idea of distinct senses incoherent. On this view, we need to move “beyond percep-
tual modality” (Shimojo et al., 2001): there is just one complex perceptual system responsive to many different
types of proximal stimulus information and, correspondingly, just one “metamodal” experience of the world. The
Gricean criteria neither separately nor collectively allow us to construct a theoretically productive taxonomy of
the senses.
A number of philosophers have criticized this maximally skeptical view. Fiona Macpherson (2011a, 2014) argues
that applying the four Gricean criteria in conjunction permits us to construct a fine‐grained, multidimensional space of
actual and possible senses, one that takes into account the diverse ways in which perceptual systems cooperate and
share information with each other. Matthew Fulkerson (2014) makes a strong case for sensory pluralism, the view that
there are multiple, theoretically productive ways of “carving up” the perceptual modalities and their interactions. On
this view, we should not expect a single, unified account of each sense. “Relative to a purely physiological criterion,”
for example, “we can categorize touch and temperature as separate modalities, but when they function reliably to
bring awareness of wetness and material composition they are better categorized as part of a single haptic system”
(Fulkerson, 2014: 3). Mohan Matthen (2015) argues that the senses can be usefully individuated, in part, by the inter-
connected, activities of purposeful, environmental exploration that they involve. Full acknowledgment of the diverse
forms of multisensory processing and their impacts on perceptual consciousness as well as the various investigative
contexts in which research on perception is undertaken, if these philosophers are right, makes individuating the
senses a far more complicated project than traditionally supposed, but, contrary to the maximally skeptical view
described above, it does not render that project incoherent.
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1 I follow O′Callaghan in defining a “mere” experience of a modality p as one that allows the subject to have had earlier expe-
riences in modalities other than p but requires that the subject's overall perceptual experience remains wholly of p, while
the experience occurs. This way of formulating the decomposition thesis notably allows for the possibility that certain mul-
timodal “unity” relations may contribute to the phenomenal character of conscious experience (Bayne & Chalmers 2003;
Bayne 2010, 2014). For skepticism about this idea, however, see Bennett and Hill (2014).
2 I should emphasize that O′Callaghan's aim is not decisively to refute skeptics about intermodal binding awareness (O′Cal-
laghan, forthcoming). Rather his argument is that a number of independent sources of evidence converge in support of the
existence of such awareness. My own assessment, as should be clear, is less optimistic.
3 For brain‐imaging evidence that significantly overlapping neural networks and representations support rhythm perception
across audition, vision, and touch, see Araneda et al., forthcoming.
4 Richard Stevenson (2014) writes: “There is widespread agreement that when naive participants consume food, their expe-
rience of flavor is of a perceptual whole, something more than just taste, smell, and somatosensation... McBurney (1986)
has offered a related description, referring to flavor as a perceptual fusion, distinct from synthesis (complete loss of parts)
and analysis (complete access to parts). Fusion refers to a percept in which the individual sensory components are not
eclipsed but where something unique to that combination of components emerges” (489).
5 But see Chalmers (in preparation) for an argument that nonillusory mirror perception involves the cognitive penetration of
visual experience by beliefs.
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